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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1992) and § 63-46b-16 
(1988) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The relief that may be granted by the appellate court on 
review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings is governed by Utah Code Ann.
 r § 63-46b-16(4) (1988)• 
In addition to showing one or more of the many standards stated in 
§ 63-46b-16(4) , the parties seeking judicial review must show 
substantial prejudice. 
A. Did the Industrial Commission have jurisdiction to 
consider UOSH's Motion For Review when the motion was filed more 
than thirty days after the issuance of the underlying order? This 
issue presents a general question of law which is reviewed under a 
correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's 
decision. Niederhauser Ornamental v. Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1034 
(Utah App. 1993); Krantz v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 856 P. 2d 369 
(Utah App. 1993); King v. Industrial Commission,. 850 P.2d 1281 
(Utah App. 1993). 
B. Did the Commission act without jurisdiction and err as a 
matter of law when it entered the Order Granting Motion For 
Extension Of Time on remand? This issue presents subsidiary 
questions of whether the Order Granting Motion For Extension Of 
1 
Time was an improper nunc pro tunc order, whether an extension of 
time was necessary, whether § 63-46b-l(9) authorizes an extension 
of time for filing a motion for review, whether UOSH established 
good cause or excusable neglect for an extension of time pursuant 
to Rules 6(b) and 81(d) and whether Dusty's v. Utah State Tax 
Commission applies retrospectively. In the broad view, the issue 
is one of whether the Commission acted without jurisdiction and it 
is therefore reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving 
no deference to the agency's decision. Niederhauser Ornamentalf 
858 P.2d 1034; Krantz, 856 P.2d 369; King. 850 P.2d 1281. The 
question of whether the Commission's Order Granting Motion For 
Extension Of Time was an improper nunc pro tunc order is similarly 
treated under a correction or error standard and falls into the 
purview of subsections (d), (e) and (h) (iv) of § 63-46b-16. Under 
subsection (h)(iv), the Commission's action is viewed for 
reasonableness. Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 
860 P. 2d 944 (Utah App. 1993); La Sal Oil v. Dept. of Environmental 
Quality, 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah App. 1992). Those standards also 
apply to the issues of whether an extension of time was necessary, 
whether § 63-46b-l(9) authorized an extension of time, whether 
Rules 6(b) and 81(d) applied to require UOSH to establish excusable 
neglect or good cause and whether the decision in Dusty'& v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, applies retrospectively. 
C. Did the Commission err as a matter of law when it 
reversed the ALJ's order and entered summary judgment against 
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Magcorp? As an issue presenting a claim of arbitrary or capricious 
action, the Commission's action is reviewed for reasonableness. 
Maverick, 860 P.2d 944; La Sal Oil, 843 P.2d 1045. Under section 
63-46b-16(d) and (e), a correction of error standard is applied. 
Niederhauser Ornamental, 858 P.2d 1034; Krantz, 856 P.2d 369; King, 
850 P.2d 1281. 
D. Did the Commission err as a matter of law when it ordered 
Magcorp to provide and pay for laundry services for its employees 
using protective coveralls exposed to Fiberfrax without first 
affording Magcorp notice and a hearing on the issue? As a question 
of general law viewed under §§ 63-46b-16(b), (d) and (e), a 
correction of error standard giving no deference to the 
Commission's decision is applied. The issue may also be reviewed 
under the arbitrary or capricious standard presented in subdivision 
(h)(iv) of § 63-46b-16 for reasonableness. Maverick. 860 P.2d 944; 
La Sal Oil, 843 P.2d 1045. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Statutes: 
Utah Code Ann., § 35-9-12 (1989) (please see Addendum G for text) 
Utah Code Ann. . § 63-46b-12 (1988) (please see Addendum H for text) 
Utah Code Ann. , § 63-46b-16 (1988) (please see Addendum I for text) 
Court Rules; 
Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
(please see Addendum J for text) 
Rule 81(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
(please see Addendum K for text) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal is taken from the Order Granting Motion For Review 
entered by the Industrial Commission of Utah on December 17, 1992, 
the Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss that preceeded the 
Order Granting Motion For Review in which the Commission determined 
that it had jurisdiction to review the Order and Findings And 
Conclusions entered by the ALJ# and the Order Granting Motion For 
Extension Of Time issued by the Commission on October 20, 1993, 
after limited remand by the Court of Appeals. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
Petitioner, Magnesium Corporation of America ("Magcorp"), 
contested a citation and notification of penalty that was issued by 
the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division ("UOSH") on 
September 3, 1991. Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment was heard 
by the Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Industrial Commission of Utah ("ALJ")# on April 17, 1992. [R. 383-
450]. The ALJ ruled that the abatement order contained in the UOSH 
citation requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame resistant 
coveralls purportedly required under 29 CFR 1910.132(a) was 
unenforceable and void as a matter of law and therefore granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of Magcorp on that issue. [R. 
171, 173]. In addition, the ALJ found that disputed issues of 
material facts existed in regard to the issue of whether Magcorp 
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was in compliance with 29 CFR 1910.132(a) and for that reason 
denied summary judgment on that issue. [R. 171, 174]. Based on 
that ruling, Magcorp, on April 28, 1992, withdrew its objection to 
the penalty assessed in conjunction with the Citation And Notice Of 
Penalty and paid the amount UOSH had assessed. [R. 314]. 
On July 16, 1992, some thirty-six days after the ALJ's order 
was issued, UOSH filed its Motion For Review. [R. 177, 178-182]. 
Magcorp then filed its Motion To Dismiss, asserting that UOSH's 
Motion For Review was filed more than 30 days after the order 
sought to be reviewed was issued and that the Industrial Commission 
therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider the Motion For Review. 
[R. 208-209, 211-252]. On October 9, 1992, the Commission issued 
its Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss, ruling that UOSH's 
Motion For Review was timely filed based on the date indicated on 
the mailing certificate purportedly attached to the ALJ's Order on 
June 16, 1992, and directed Magcorp to respond to UOSH's Motion For 
Review. [R. 288-291]. The Commission issued its Order Granting 
Motion For Review on December 17, 1992. [R. 336-341]. Magcorp 
filed its Petition For Writ Of Review on January 14, 1993. [R. 
344-45]. Magcorp filed its [First] Motion For Summary Disposition 
and supporting memorandum on February 26, 1993. [R. 471-472, 473-
501]. 
Magcorp informed the court of appeals that the June 10, 1992 
Order signed by the ALJ had been improperly altered, and the 
parties subsequently stipulated that the material error should be 
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corrected. [R. 507-508, 509, 510-512, 515, 521]. On April 29, 
1993, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Commission 
to allow UOSH to bring a motion for extension of time under Utah 
Code Ann.f § 63-46b-l (Supp. 1992). [R. 519]. The Commission did 
not rule on the UOSH Motion For Extension Of Time until October 20, 
1993, when it issued its Order Granting Motion For Extension Of 
Time. [R. 533-538]. 
Magcorp filed its Second Motion For Summary Disposition and 
supporting Memorandum on or about November 30, 1993. [R. 542-574]. 
By Order dated December 17, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals ordered 
that Magcorp's first and second motions for summary disposition 
were denied and the issues raised deferred pending plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. On August 17, 1991, subsequent to inspection number 
105638639, the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division 
("UOSH") issued a Citation And Notification Of Penalty to the 
petitioner, Magnesium Corporation of America ("Magcorp"), alleging 
Magcorp failed to provide the use of flame resistant protective 
clothing in the electrolytic and reactor sections of Magcorp's 
plant in violation of 29 CFR 1910.132(a) and alleging violations of 
USGOR 500-405-558.2.7.[R. 001-002]. 
2. That citation was withdrawn and a second Citation And 
Notification Of Penalty was subsequently reissued to Magcorp on 
September 3, 1991. [R. 001-003]. 
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3. As a result of the alleged violation, UOSH imposed a 
$2,200,00 penalty, together with an abatement order requiring 
Magcorp to provide flame resistant clothing to all applicable 
employees at no cost or financial expense to the employees. [R. 
002]. 
4. Magcorp contested the Citation And Notice Of Penalty and 
filed its Motion For Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum and 
affidavits on March 24, 1992. [R. 014-091]. 
5. Magcorp7s Motion For Summary Judgment was heard by the 
Honorable Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Industrial Commission of Utah ("ALJ"), on April 17, 1992. [R. 124, 
383-450]. 
6. At that hearing, counsel for both parties presented 
evidence and oral argument regarding two issues: 1) Whether Magcorp 
had violated 29 CFR 1910.132(a) by failing to provide flame 
resistant personal protective clothing to certain Magcorp employees 
engaging in duties in the areas known as the reactor and 
electrolytic sections of Magcorp's plant, and 2) Whether UOSH 
properly included in the Citation And Notification Of Penalty an 
abatement note requiring Magcorp to bear the costs of flame 
resistant personal protective clothing purportedly required under 
29 CFR 1910.132(a) for its employees. [R. 394, 383-450]. 
7. The ALJ considered, inter alia, the August 9, 1985 
Memorandum of Byron R. Chadwick, Regional Administrator of the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
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that set forth guidelines to be followed by OSHA agencies in 
determining the allocation of cost for protective equipment 
required under 29 CFR 1910.132(a), [R. 90-91, 171, 315-316, 402-
403, 410], the decision in The Budd Co. v. OSHRC. 513 F.2d 807 (3rd 
Cir. 1975), 2 OSCH 1698 (1975), [R. 171, 173, 402-403], and 
documents and affidavits addressing Magcorp/s collective bargaining 
with the United Steelworkers of America regarding payment for 
protective equipment. [R. 44-48, 358-381, 382, 389, 395, 417-419, 
425-428]. 
8. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ ruled that the 
abatement note contained in the UOSH Citation And Notification Of 
Penalty requiring Magcorp to bear the costs of flame resistant 
personal protective clothing purportedly required under 29 CFR 
1910.132(a) was unenforceable and void as a matter of law and 
therefore granted partial summary judgment in favor of Magcorp on 
that issue. [R. 170-171, 173, 446-449]. 
9. The ALJ also determined that disputed issues of material 
fact existed in regard to the issue whether Magcorp was in 
compliance with 29 CFR 1910.132(a) and for that reason denied 
summary judgment on that issue. [R. 170-171, 174]. 
10. Based on the ALJ's ruling, Magcorp, on April 28, 1992, 
withdrew its objection to the Citation And Notice Of Penalty issued 
in conjunction with the Citation and paid the $2,200.00 penalty 
that UOSH had assessed. [R. 314]. 
11. That payment of penalty was based solely on the fact that 
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Magcorp did not require its employees to wear flame resistant 
personal protective clothing and was not an admission that Magcorp 
was required to provide the clothing at its own expense. [R.314]. 
12. Copies of the proposed Order and proposed Findings And 
Conclusions were provided to UOSH/s counsel on approximately April 
28, 1992, and May 27, 1992. [R. 168, 172, 222]. 
13. UOSH's counsel signed both documents "approved as to 
form." [R. 168, 172, 174, 222]. 
14. The Order, [R.173-174], and the Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") [R.169-172], 
regarding the Motion For Summary Judgment were signed by the ALJ on 
June 10, 1992 in the presence of counsel for both parties. [R. 222, 
223, 225, 269]. 
15. The Order and the Findings And Conclusions were passed by 
the Industrial Commission Of Utah ("Commission") on that same date. 
[R. 171, 174]. 
16. June A. Stoddard, a paralegal in the Industrial 
Commission Adjudication Division, filed the order on June 10, 1992. 
[R. 226]. 
17. Ms. Stoddard hand-delivered a certified copy to counsel 
for Magcorp and then placed a second certified copy in a box to be 
forwarded to counsel for UOSH. [R. 222, 225-226, 264]. 
18. On June 10, 1992, Magcorp's counsel offered UOSH's 
counsel a photocopy of the certified copy of the Order. [R. 222-
225]. 
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19. UOSH's counsel declined the offer and stated he had 
retained a copy of the Order that he had previously executed 
"approved as to form." [R. 168, 272]. 
20. On or about June 16, 1992, a certificate of mailing that 
was signed by Pilar Gorlinski, another Adjudication Division 
employee, for June A. Stoddard was attached to the Order. [R. 175, 
264]. 
21. Neither of the parties nor their counsel received a copy 
of the Order as a result of the Order purportedly being mailed as 
was averred in the mailing certificate, and there is no credible 
evidence that the Order was properly mailed to the parties or their 
counsel on June 16, 1992. [R. 223, 226, 269]. 
22. On July 16, 1992, some 36 days after the ALJ's Order was 
issued, UOSH filed its Motion For Review, along with a supporting 
memorandum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.f § 63-46b-12 (1988), 
requesting that the Order entered by the ALJ be reversed and that 
the cause be remanded for a hearing on the merits. [R. 176-201]. 
23. In initial response to UOSH's Motion For Review, Magcorp 
filed its Motion To Dismiss, along with a supporting memorandum, on 
or about August 11, 1992, asserting that UOSH's Motion For Review 
was filed more than 30 days after the issuance of the Order UOSH 
sought to be reviewed. [R. 208-252]. 
24. The Commission, on October 9, 1992, issued its Interim 
Order Denying Motion To Dismiss, ruling that UOSH/s Motion For 
Review was timely filed based on the date indicated on the June 16, 
10 
1992 mailing certificate purportedly attached to the ALJ's Order 
six days after its issuance and directed Magcorp to respond to 
UOSH's Motion For Review. [R. 175, 288-91, 507-508, 509, 510-512, 
513, 515]. 
25. After the parties submitted memoranda addressing UOSH's 
Motion For Review, the Commission issued its Order Granting Motion 
For Review on December 17, 1992. [R. 177, 178-182, 293-316, 336-
341]. 
26. The Commission's Order Granting Motion For Review was 
necessarily based on its earlier determination, as stated in the 
Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss, that it had jurisdiction 
to review the Order and the Findings And Conclusions previously 
entered by the ALJ. [R. 288-291, 336-341]. 
27. Magcorp filed its Petition For Writ Of Review on January 
14, 1993, and its Docketing Statement on February 18, 1993. [R. 
344-345, 451-470]. 
28. Magcorp filed its [First] Motion For Summary Disposition 
and supporting memorandum on February 26, 1993. [R. 471-501]. 
29. On or about April 7, 1993, Magcorp filed its Motion To 
Correct Record which was supported by the Stipulation of the 
parties in which the parties agreed that a date on the June 10, 
1992 Order signed by the ALJ had been altere that page 174 of the 
Record should ^ corrected to indicate that the Industrial 
Commission's stamp appearing on that page should be dated the 10th 
day of June instead of the 16th and that the Order was "passed" by 
11 
the Commission on that date. [R. 507-508, 509, 510-512, 513-515, 
521]. 
30. The counsel ordered the Industrial Commission to make the 
stipulated corrections to the record. [R. 521, 606-607]. 
31. On April 29, 1993 the Utah Court of Appeals remanded the 
case to the Commission "for the limited purpose of allowing 
respondent to bring a motion for an extension under Utah Code Ann. , 
§ 63-46b-l (Supp. 1992). The Commission shall forward a copy of 
its order on the Motion to this court promptly." [R. 519]. 
32. The parties filed their respective memoranda addressing 
UOSH's Motion For Extension Of Time, and the Commission did not 
rule on the Motion For Extension Of Time until October 20, 1993, 
when it issued its Order Granting Motion For Extension of Time. [R. 
522-523, 526-532, 533-538]. 
33. Magcorp,s Second Motion For Summary Disposition was filed 
on November 30, 1993. [R. 542-543, 544-576]. 
34. By Order dated December 17, 1993, the Utah Court of 
Appeals denied the motions for summary disposition Magcorp had 
filed and deferred ruling on the issues raised therein pending 
plenary presentation and arbitration of the case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION LACKED JURISDICTION 
TO CONSIDER UOSH#S MOTION FOR REVIEW BECAUSE 
THE MOTION WAS FILED MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFTER 
THE ISSURANCE OF THE UNDERLYING ORDER. 
The constellation of arguments subsumed under Magcorp's Point 
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I establish that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider 
UOSH's Motion For Review because the motion was filed more than 30 
days after the issuance of the underlying Order made by the ALJ and 
issued by the Commission on June 16, 1992. Those issues were, in 
large part, raised in Magcorp's [First] Motion For Summary 
Disposition and Second Motion For Summary Disposition, and those 
issues have been deferred pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of this case. The Commission's Order Granting Motion 
For Extension Of Time entered after remand also suffers from the 
jurisdictional infirmity. That order was an improper nunc pro tunc 
order, and the Court of Appeal's remand did not revive the 
jurisdiciton the Commission had lost. The Commission further erred 
when it determined that an extension of time was not necessary, 
that § 63-46b-l(9) allowed for an extension of time in which UOSH 
could file its motion for review, that UOSH established good cause 
for the extension and that excusble neglect was not the applicable 
standard to be applied, and in failing to give Dusty's v. Utah 
State Tax Commission retrospective application. All of the actions 
of the Commission, including those on remand, are null and void for 
lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order should be 
recognized as and remain the final judgment in this case. 
II. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
IT REVERSED THE ALJ#S ORDER AND ENTERED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MAGCORP. 
In its Order Granting Motion For Review, the Commission 
concluded that disputed issues of material facts existed but then 
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went on to reverse the ALJ's Order and enter summary judgment 
against Magcorp dispite those disputed issues of fact. That action 
was clearly violative of Utah Rule of civil Procedure, 56(c) and 
was arbitrary and capricious. If this court determines the 
Commission had jurisdiction to enter the Order Granting Motion For 
Review and accepts the Commission's conclusion that genuine issues 
of material facts exist, Magcorp requests that it be allowed a full 
hearing before the ALJ on the merits of the Citation And 
Notification Of Penalty. 
III. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
IT ORDERED MAGCORP TO PROVIDE AND PAY FOR 
LAUNDRY SERVICES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES FOR 
PROTECTIVE COVERALLS EXPOSED TO FIBERFRAX 
WITHOUT FIRST AFFORDING MAGCORP NOTICE AND A 
HEARING ON THE ISSUE. 
The Commission entertained issues that were not raised in the 
Citation And Notification Of Penalty that initiated this action and 
ordered Magcorp to provide and pay for laundry services for the 
protective coveralls. That action denied Magcorp due process and 
proper notice. This court should reverse the laundry services 
portion of the order of the Order Granting Motion For Review. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION LACKED JURISDICTION 
TO CONSIDER UOSH'S MOTION FOR REVIEW BECAUSE 
THE MOTION WAS FILED MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFTER 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE UNDERLYING ORDER. 
Magcorp7s [First] Motion For Summary Disposition and Second 
Motion For Summary Disposition and supporting memoranda [R. 471-
501, 542-574] were denied and the issues presented therein deferred 
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pending plenary presentation and consideration of the case by order 
of the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1993. Magcorp submits 
that the Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") lacked 
jurisdiction, both initially and on remand, to consider UOSH's 
Motion For Review and UOSH's Motion For Extension Of Time. 
A. UOSH#s Motion For Review was filed more than 
30 days after the Industrial Commission 
"issued" the Order. 
The Order and the Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
("Findings And Conclusions") were signed by the ALJ and also issued 
by the Commission on June 10, 1992. Utah Code Ann. , § 63-46b-
12(1)(a) (1988), states: 
If a statute or the agency's rules permit 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek 
review of the order by the agency or by a 
superior agency, the aggrieved party may file 
a written request for review within 30 days 
after the issuance of the order with the 
person or entity designated for that purpose 
by statute or rule. 
The 30 day time limit for filing a motion for review is mandatory 
and is the jurisdictional linchpin upon which the reviewing 
tribunal's jurisdiction depends. See Bonded Bicycle v. Dept. of 
Employment Security. 844 P. 2d 358, 359-60 (Utah App. 1992) (per 
curiam); Silva v. Dept. of Employment Security. 786 P.2d 246, 247 
(Utah App. 1990) (per curiam); Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux. 767 P.2d 
569, 571 (Utah App. 1989); Retherford v. Industrial Commission. 739 
P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1987); Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co.. 767 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984). UOSH's Motion For Review was 
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not filed until July 16, 1992, six days after the termination of 
the 30 day time limit for filing a motion for review. [R. 177]. 
The Commission did not have jurisdiction to consider the motion and 
should have dismissed it as a matter of law. In considering the 
Motion For Review, the Commission clearly acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred upon it, erroneously interpreted and applied 
the law, engaged in an unlawful procedure and acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, substantially prejudicing Magcorp. See Utah Code 
Ann.f § 63-46b-16(4) (1988). 
Subsection (l)(a) of § 63-46b-12 has not been amended since 
April 25, 1988, and the date of an order's issuance has always 
been synonymous with the date the order bears on its face. 
Support for that conclusion is found in the 
U.A.P.A. itself. Section 63-46b-21 governs 
agency action of declaratory orders. After 
receiving petitions for declaratory orders, 
agencies may issue written orders. Copies of 
all orders issued in response to requests for 
declaratory proceedings must be mailed 
promptly to petitioners or other parties. 
Inasmuch as declaratory orders have the same 
status and binding effect as any other orders 
issued in an adjudicative proceeding, it 
follows that the differentiation between 
issuance and mailing may not be limited to 
declaratory orders alone, (footnote omitted). 
Dusty#s v. Utah State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) 
(per curiam). The Utah Court of Appeals is "bound to follow the 
1
 A previous version, Utah Code Ann., § 63-46b-12(l) (1987), 
provided for only "10 days" as the time in which the aggrieved 
party could file a written request for review. See Hi-Country 
Homeowners v. PSC of Utah, 779 P2d 682, 683 (Utah 1989). 
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rule of law as it has been pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court." 
Bonded Bicycle, 844 P.2d at 360. 
It is undisputed that UOSH did not file its Motion For Review 
until July 16, 1992, some 36 days after the Order was issued. The 
30 day period for filing the Motion For Review was not extended by 
a Commission decision rendered after the filing of a proper and 
timely motion for extension of time. Furthermore, UOSH cannot 
claim justifiable reliance on Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 
1199 (Utah App. 1992), under the peculiar facts of this case as 
they repeatedly have done in responding to this issue. UOSH's 
primary argument was that it could rely on the June 16, 1992 
mailing date stated on the mailing certificate purportedly attached 
to the order nearly a week after it was issued. [R. 175]. That 
argument is not only contrary to law, but in addition the mailing 
certificate provides no evidence of an actual or proper mailing 
because it did not result in actual receipt by any of the parties. 
[T. 223, 226, 269]. The June 16, 1992 date is not "accurately 
evidenced" by the mailing certificate. Wiggins
 P 824 P.2d at 1199. 
Notably, the Order appearing in the record of the proceedings is a 
? . . . 
photocopy [R. 173-174]c and no similar mailing certificate was 
attached to the Findings And Conclusions. [R. 169-172]. 
Copies of the proposed Order and proposed Findings And 
? . . . 
c
 The pr ous page 174 of the record, which existed prior to 
the record being corrected [see e.g., R. 313], was also a 
photocopy. The original page of the document represented at page 
174 of the record has never been part of the record of proceedings. 
17 
Conclusions were provided to UOSH's counsel on approximately April 
28, 1992 and May 27, 1992. [R. 168, 172, 222]. Counsel for both 
parties were present when the ALJ signed the Order and the Findings 
And Conclusions, and UOSH/s counsel had actual notice that the 
order was signed on June 10, 1992. [R. 222, 223, 225, 269]. 
UOSH's counsel had signed both documents "approved as to form". 
[R. 168, 174, 222]. On June 10, 1992, June Stoddard, a paralegal 
in the Commission's Adjudication Division, placed a copy of the 
Order in a box in her work area from which it was to be taken by 
another Adjudication Division employee and forwarded to UOSH's 
counsel. [R. 225-226, 264]. UOSH's counsel had actual notice that 
Magcorp's counsel received a certified copy of the Order, and 
Magcorp's counsel then personally offered to provide UOSH's counsel 
with a copy. [R. 222-225]. UOSH's counsel declined that offer and 
stated he had retained a copy of the Order that he previously 
executed "approved as to form." [R. 168, 222]. Most important, he 
declined personal service of a copy that same day when one was 
offered to him by Magcorp's counsel and stated he would rely on the 
copy he already had. [R. 168, 227]. In addition, UOSH was 
undoubtedly aware that the Order should have been entered no later 
than 30 days after the April 17, 1992 hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 
35-9-12(3)(b) (1989). 
On approximately June 16 or 17, 1992, UOSH's counsel informed 
June Stoddard that he had not received an executed copy of that 
order. [R. 226]. Ms. Stoddard indicated he should have received 
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one because she placed it in the box for mailing on June 10, 1992. 
[R. 226]. On or about approximately June 23 through June 26, 1992, 
UOSH's counsel again inquired of Ms. Stoddard why he had not 
received a ccoy of the order. [R. 226]. At that time, Ms. Stoddard 
personally went to the file cabinet which contained the file, 
pulled the Order, made a copy and hand-delivered the Order to 
UOSH's counsel. [R. 223]. Neither of the parties7 counsel 
received a copy of the Order in the mail or by other mode of 
delivery as a result of the Order allegedly being mailed as was 
averred in the mailing certificate dated June 16, 1992. [R. 175, 
223, 226, 269]. UOSH's counsel was unequivocally aware of the 
contents of the Order and the Findings and Conclusions and that 
they had both been signed by ALJ on June 10, 1992. He further had 
easy access to the Adjudication Division's file to check the date 
the Order was "passed" by the Commission. 
UOSH's attempt to rely on the June 16, 1992 mailing 
certificate is questionable at best. The fact that the alleged 
June 16, 1992 mailing date coincides with the as of yet unexplained 
alteration of the date hand-written onto the Industrial 
Commission's stamp that appeared on the second page of the Order 
before the record was corrected calls UOSH's reliance into 
question. [R. 174, 507-508, 509, 510-512, 513-515, 521]. It is 
uncontroverted, however, that UOSH's counsel had a copy of and 
actual notice of the signing of the Order. "It would be improper 
to find that sloppy office procedures in some way expanded 
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jurisdiction beyond that conferred by the legislature. Subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot by expanded by waiver or consent." 
Varian-Eimac, 767 P. 2d at 571 and n.3; Cf. 10/9/92 Interim Order 
Denying Motion To Dismiss at 2. [R. 289]. That rule is 
particularly applicable in cases such as this where UOSH is a 
division of the Commission, the Commission was the reviewing 
tribunal and the Commissions counsel has appeared to argue the 
case on the merits. See Memorandum In Opposition To Petitioner's 
Motion For Summary Disposition [R. 584-593]; Notice Of Correction 
Of Record [R. 605-607]; and see Notice Of Appearance Of Counsel in 
the Utah Court of Appeals dated September 23, 1993. 
Because UOSH's Motion For Review was not timely filed, the 
Commission, inter alia, acted without jurisdiction by proceeding 
and entering adjudication on the merits of the case, Benchmark v. 
Salt Lake Valley Mental Health Board, Inc. . 830 P.2d 218, 219 (Utah 
1991); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987), 
and substantially prejudiced Magcorp by denying it the benefit of 
the ALJ's ruling and also its right to proceed to a full hearing on 
the merits of the case. Both the Interim Order Denying Motion To 
Dismiss and the Order Granting Motion For Review were entered 
absent jurisdiction and are therefore null and void. Thompson. 943 
P.2d at 1232. As a result, the ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order must 
remain the final agency order in this action. 
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B. The Commission#s Order Granting Motion For 
Extension Of Time entered after remand was 
entered absent jurisdiction and is erroneous 
as a matter of law. 
1.) The Commission's Order Granting 
Motion For Extension Of Time is an 
improper nunc pro tunc order. 
Despite UOSH's awareness of Utah Code Ann., § 63-46b-l(9) 
(Supp. 1992), at the time Magcorp filed its Motion To Dismiss, it 
failed to make a formal motion for an extension in time in which to 
file its Motion For Review. [R. 257, 533]. Because UOSH did not 
properly raise or preserve its request for an extension of time, it 
should not have been allowed to advance that request on appeal. 
This court nonetheless remanded the case to the Commission "for the 
limited purpose of allowing respondent to bring a motion for an 
extension of time under Utah Code Ann.r § 63-46b-l (Supp. 1992)." 
The resulting Order Granting Motion For Extension Of Time is an 
improper nunc pro tunc order. 
A nunc pro tunc order may be properly entered only "for the 
purpose of making the record reflect what actually was meant to 
happen at a prior time." Baashaw v. Bacrshaw. 788 P.2d 1057, 1061 
(Utah App. 1990) . 
In Bagshaw, this court explained the 
principles of nunc pro tunc. 
At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed 
a court to correct its earlier error 
or supply its omission so that the 
record accurately reflected that 
which in fact had taken place. 
Cases in which courts traditionally 
have applied the nunc pro tunc 
doctrine fall into two categories: 
(1) Those in which one of the 
parties died after the submission of 
the case to the lower court for its 
decision, but before the actual 
rendition of judgment; and 
(2) Those in which a judgment has in 
fact been rendered by the lower 
court, but the clerk has failed to 
perform the ministerial function of 
entry. 
Bagshaw, 788 P. 2d at 1060 (quoting 6A James W. 
Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 58.08 
(1989)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Thus, nunc pro tunc orders are 
used to correct the court's omission or error. 
Further, any issue addressed in the order must 
have been previously submitted to the court. 
Moreover, nunc pro tunc orders cannot be used 
,f,to revive the time for taking the required 
step in a legal proceeding after the statutory 
time for doing so [has] elapsed.,fl Diehl 
Lumber Transp., Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P. 2 d 
739, 743 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Kettner v. 
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 
1962)). 
Southwick v. Leone, 860 P. 2d 973, 977-78 (Utah App. 1993). See 
also Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1984). "The court 
cannot enter a nunc pro tunc order based on what it might or should 
have done had there been a motion or hearing...[;it cannot] 
bootstrap its authority to act simply by issuing a nunc pro tunc 
order relating back..." Southwick, 860 P.2d at 978. UOSH did not 
file a motion for extension of time prior to filing its Motion For 
Review with the Commission, and the Commission did not address the 
issue at the time. This court's remand Order did not change those 
facts and could not, by way of an anomalous procedural device, 
endow the Commission with the jurisdiction it otherwise did not 
have to consider the untimely Motion For Review or the clearly 
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unmeritorious Motion For Extension Of Time. UOSH should not have 
been allowed to resurrect a right forfeited by passage of time. 
The October 20, 1993 Order Granting Motion For Extension Of Time is 
therefore invalid. 
2.) An extension of time was necessary. 
The Commission's Order Granting Motion For Extension Of Time 
concludes "no extension of time was necessary." [R. 534-535]. 
That conclusion is erroneous as a matter of law. Even assuming the 
30 day period for filing the Motion For Review could have been 
extended after the fact, extension could only be accomplished by 
the timely filing of a motion for extension of time. The fact that 
the Court of Appeals directed the Commission to address the issue 
establishes a motion was necessary in this case, although Magcorp 
disagrees with the procedural propriety of the remand. The 
Commission's conclusion to the contrary was based on an erroneous 
interpretation and application of the law, was an abuse of 
discretion and was arbitrary and capricious. 
3.) Section 63-46b-l(9) does not 
expressly authorize an extension of 
time for filing a motion for review. 
Utah Code Ann., § 63-46b-12(l)(a) (1988), provides "the 
aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 30 
days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity 
designated for that purpose by the statute or rule." Following 
UOSH's suggestion, the Commission concluded that Utah Code Ann., § 
63-46b-l(9), allows the Commission to grant an extension of time 
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for filing a motion for review even after the 30 day period has 
elapsed. [R. 534], The Commission relied on Maverick Country 
Stores v. Industrial Commission, 214 U.A.R. 34, 37, P.2d 
(Utah App. 1993), to support its conclusion. Maverick, however, 
did not specifically address the issue of whether § 63-46b-l(9) 
could be invoked after the statutory time period has elapsed to 
extend the time for filing a motion for review for good cause 
shown. UOSH's Motion For Extension Of Time was not filed until May 
28, 1993, nearly eleven months after the fact. [R. 522]. Because 
the petitioner in Maverick filed a request for reconsideration, in 
which it made no attempt to show good cause, instead of a motion 
for extension of time, Maverick cannot be fairly stretched to 
support the propositions that a motion for extension of time can be 
filed after the 30 day time limit or that good cause is sufficient 
to support a motion for extension made after the expiration of the 
specified period. 
Administrative agencies have no more power than that which is 
expressly or impliedly granted by statute. Nielsen v. Division of 
P.O.S.T., 851 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah App. 1993); Olympus Oil, Inc.. 
v. Harrison, 778 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah App. 1989). See also 
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) 
(any reasonable doubt of the existence of agency power must be 
^ That opinion was amended on September 7, 1993, prior to the 
issuance of the Commission's Order Granting Motion For Extension Of 
Time. Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 
944 (Utah App. 1993) . 
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resolved against the existence of such power); Bevans v. Industrial 
Commission. 790 P. 2d 573, 578 (Utah App. 1990) ("The Industrial 
Commission is not free to 'legislate' in areas apparently 
overlooked by our lawmakers or to exercise power not expressly or 
impliedly granted to it by the legislature, even in the name of 
fairness."). The Commission failed to harmonize § 63-46b-12(l)(a) 
(1988) with § 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1992). If this court were to 
approve that approach, the result would be chaotic administrative 
and judicial appellate procedure. See e.g., Silva v. Dept. of 
Employment Security, 786 P.2d at 247; Isaacson v. Dorius. 669 P.2d 
849, 851 (Utah 1983). The 30 day jurisdictional bar proscribed by 
§ 63-46b-12(l)(a) is rendered illusory if the Commission at any 
later date and based merely on good cause may extend that 30 day 
time period. Nothing would prevent the Commission from granting 
its own Occupational Health and Safety Division's motion for an 
extension of time made months or even years after the statutory 
period had run, and the certainty that normally attaches to 
administrative decisions would be lost. See Silva, 786 P. 2d at 
247. The Commission adopted a notion that defies both common sense 
and jurisprudential reason; that § 63-46b-l(9) affords the 
Commission unlimited power to lengthen any time period if presented 
with a motion filed at any time after the proceedings are otherwise 
final. In adhering to that notion, the Commission acted beyond its 
* Cf. Utah R. App. P. 4(e); and see Prowswood, Inc., v. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 767 P.2d 952, 959-61 (Utah App. 1987). 
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jurisdiction, misinterpreted and misapplied the law, abused its 
discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
4.) UOSH did not establish good cause or 
excusable neglect for an extension 
of time. 
In response to UOSH's belated Motion For Extension Of Time, 
Magcorp argued that Rules 6(b) and 81(d), U.R.C.P., required UOSH 
to show excusable neglect before an extension of time could be 
granted. The Commission concluded that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure did not apply and that a showing of excusable neglect was 
not required. [R. 535, 537]. The Commission failed to analyze the 
applicability of Rule 6(b), but instead reached its conclusion by 
setting up straw men in the form of Rule 6(e) and 81(a), and 
knocking them down with Maverick (214 U.A.R. 34) and Griffith v. 
Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204 (1965). The 
application of the individual subdivisions of each rule must be 
analyzed separately. 
Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., states: 
When by these rules or by a notice given 
thereunder or by order of the court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may 
at any time in its discretion (1) with or 
without motion or notice order the period 
enlarged if request therefore is made before 
the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by a previous order 
or (2) upon motion made after the expiration 
of the specified period permit the act to be 
done where the failure to act was the result 
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend 
the time for taking any action under rules 
50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 
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73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under 
the conditions stated in them. (emphasis 
added). 
The Commission misinterpreted the remand to be for the purpose of 
"a determination whether UOSH showed good cause for an extension of 
time to file its motion for review...." [R. 533]. However, the 
Court of Appeals did not expressly or implicitly state that good 
cause was the applicable standard. "On remand the trial court has 
only such jurisdiction with respect to an issue appealed as is 
conferred by the opinion and mandate of the appellate court." Amax 
Magnesium v. Utah State Tax Commission, 848 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 
App. 1993) (quoting Normand in re Normand v. Ray, 785 P.2d 743, 
748-49 (N.M. 1990)). And, of course, the jurisdiction of the lower 
tribunal on remand doesn't exist at all if the appellate court has 
no jurisdiction to remand the question. Rule 6(b) U.R.C.P., 
requiring excusable neglect, is made applicable to this proceeding 
by Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P. which states: 
These rules shall apply to the practice and 
procedure in appealing from or obtaining a 
review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agency, except 
insofar as the specific statutory procedure in 
connection with any such appeal or review is 
in conflict or inconsistent with these rules. 
See, e.g., Utah Chiropractic Ass/n v. Equitable Lifef 579 P.2d 
1327, 1329 (Utah 1978). Applying Rule 6(b) to these proceedings 
does not conflict or operate inconsistently with the provisions of 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Rule 6(b) actually 
supplies needed certainty with respect to the time for review. See 
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Silva. 786 P.2d at 247. If this court determines that a motion to 
enlarge time made after the expiration of the time period is 
permissible, it logically follows that the motion must be made in 
accord with rule 6(b) and that excusable neglect must be shown. 
Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 
1983) (addressing only rule 41(a)(1)), relied on by the Commission, 
was not intended to be and should not be blindly followed as a 
comprehensive discourse on the applicability of individual rules of 
civil procedure in administrative proceedings. Section 63-46b-l(9) 
provides only that "Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer,....11 It is not a specific grant of 
authority to do anything, and it does not render rule 6(b) clearly 
inapplicable. Section 63-46b-l(l) (Supp. 1992), also fails to 
support the Commission's conclusion because it provides only that 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act applies to these 
proceedings. It does not direct that the individual Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not apply. 
The facts detailed in point I.A., above, establish that UOSH 
did not demonstrate either good cause or excusable neglect for its 
failure to file the Motion For Review in time. "When the question 
of 'excusable neglect' arises in a jurisdictional context, as 
opposed to a nonjurisdictional context, the standard contemplated 
thereby is a necessarily strict one." Prowswood, 676 P.2d at 959 
(citations omitted). 
Inadvertence or mistake of counsel does not 
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constitute the type of unique or extraordinary 
circumstances contemplated by this strict 
standard. 
The application of this rule is well 
illustrated in the following cases. In Feltch 
v. General Rental Co., appellants sought to 
excuse the untimely filing of their notice of 
appeal on the basis of a mistake they had made 
in interpreting a rule of appellate procedure. 
In rejecting this excuse, the court noted the 
strict construction given the "excusable 
neglect" concept in federal forums, supra, and 
held: "A flat mistake of counsel about the 
meaning of a statute or rule may not justify 
relief: relief is not extended "to cover any 
kind of garden variety oversight." (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis added by underlining). 
Prowswood/ 676 P.2d at 960. UOSH's counsel indicated he had 
retained a copy of the Order that he had executed "approved as to 
form" prior to the ALJ signing it on June 10, 1992, in counsels' 
presence [R. 168, 172, 174, 222]. UOSH's failure to act upon the 
knowledge he had at that time does not meet the excusable neglect 
standard. See Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987); Utah Code Ann. . § 35-9-12(3) (c) 
(1989). Even the failure to receive a copy of the order from the 
Commission because it was not mailed does not constitute excusable 
neglect. See In Re: Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462, 
467 (Utah 1952). 
The thirty-day time period to file an appeal 
may not be extended because the agency's 
decision was mailed to petitioner or was not 
received by petitioner until days after its 
service. To allow time for appeal to be 
extended because of receipt in the mail is 
contrary to the statutory language and would 
render uncertain a time for appeal in 
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virtually every case. The appeal time 
commences when the final agency order issues 
and not when allegedly received by a party. 
Nor can the thirty-day time period be extended 
because the agency mailed a copy to the 
petitioner. 
Silva, 786 P.2d at 247. "[I]f during [the] period he is aware or 
should be aware of a reason for delay, then to ignore the time 
period and later claim excusable neglect, without filing for an 
extension of time, is, in our opinion, no foundation for 
objection." Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798, 801 (1964). There is no legal or factual support for 
the Commission's post-eleventh hour grant of extended time for UOSH 
to file its Motion For Review, that in actual effect unlawfully 
revived the Commission's jurisdiction over this case. 
5.) Dusty#s v, Utah State Tax Commission 
applies retrospectively. 
In what was apparently a convenient sidestep of the 
retrospective application of Dusty's, the Commission's Order 
Granting Motion For Extension Of Time contains at least four 
references to the concept of "the law in effect at the time," that 
law being Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah App. 
1992), to support the conclusion that UOSH showed good cause for an 
extension of time to file the Motion For Review. The Commission 
cited to neither a case law nor other authority to support its "law 
in effect at the time" concept. Clearly, the "law in effect at the 
time" was no different than the law as it exists today. Dusty's, 
842 P.2d at 870 ("...argument that the date of issue is ambiguous 
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and subject to several inconsistent interpretations is not 
persuasive.11) 
"In the vast majority of cases, the stated law of a decision 
is effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even a 
decision which overrules prior law." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 
P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992) (footnote omitted). 
This court has developed a sound theoretical 
framework for determining when a new rule of 
law in a civil case will be applied 
retroactively. In Van Dyke v. Chappel, we 
noted that retroactive or prospective 
operation is not a question of judicial power 
but instead depends "solely upon an appraisal 
of the relevant judicial policies to be 
advanced." We stated that in making the 
determination, 
we look to the impact retroactive 
application would have on those affected. 
When we conclude that there has been 
justifiable reliance on the prior state 
of the law or that the retroactive 
application of the new law may otherwise 
create an undue burden, the court may 
order that a decision apply only 
prospectively. (footnotes omitted). 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission. 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 
1993). As is demonstrated above in point I.A. and I.B.5., UOSH 
cannot claim justifiable reliance on any contrary prior law under 
the facts of this case to escape retrospective application of 
Dusty's. 
In addition, retrospective application of Dusty's cannot pose 
an undue burden upon UOSH where it had actual notice of and 
possession of t^e ALJ's order. See Dusty#s. 842 P.2d at 870. No 
small measure of suspicion should accompany this court's 
examination of the suggestion that the alleged June 16, 1992 
mailing certificate date is the "issue" date when that date 
coincides only with what the parties have agreed is an improperly 
altered date hand-written upon the Commission's stamp appearing on 
the second page of the June 10, 1992 Order. [R. 510-512]. 
Furthermore, even under Wigginsf "issuance" includes the date 
the agency order is "personally served". Wiggins, 824 P.2d at 
1199. For all purposes and effect, UOSH's counsel was served on 
June 10, 1992. UOSH's counsel declined personal service of a 
certified copy on June 10, 1992, when one was offered to him by 
Magcorp's counsel and he stated he would rely on the copy he 
already had. [R. 222]. Therefore, personal service upon UOSH was 
plainly completed on June 10, 1992, pursuant to Rule 4(j), 
U.R.C.P.f which provides "If the person to be served refuses to 
accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the 
person serving the same shall state the name of the process and 
offer to deliver a copy thereof." In addition, a copy of the Order 
was dedicated to him and placed by an Adjudication Division 
paralegal in a box to be forwarded to him. [R. 226]. In light of 
those facts, it is wholly unreasonable that UOSH would be permitted 
to manipulate and extend the commencement of the time within which 
a motion for review could be filed simply by declining to accept 
service of a copy of the Order. 
Dusty's v. Utah State Tax Commission has not been limited to 
only prospective application, see Maverick, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 
32 
1993); Bonded Bicycle v. Dept. of Employment Security, 844 P.2d 358 
(Utah App. 1992) (per curiam), and the Commission's Order Granting 
Motion For Extension Of Time was entered without jurisdiction and 
is erroneous as a matter of law. 
Magcorp submits that its [First] Motion For Summary 
Disposition and Second Motion For Summary Disposition call for the 
correct resolution of this case. The Commission lacked 
jurisdiction to consider UOSH's Motion For Review because the 
motion was filed more than 30 days after the issuance of the 
underlying order. The case became final and unreviewable and 
unappealable some six days prior to the filing of the Motion For 
Review. As a result, all subsequent proceedings, including those 
before this court and before the Commission on remand, are null and 
void. The ALJ's June 10, 1992 Order should be recognized as and 
remain the final judgment in this case. 
The imbricate subarguments presented above establish that the 
Commission acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon it by 
statute and also violated Utah Code Ann.r § 63-46b-16(4)(d) and 
(e), and (h)(i) and (iv) when it considered and reled on UOSH's 
Motion For Review and again when it issued the belated Order 
Granting Motion For Extension Of Time. The prejudice Magcorp has 
suffered as a result is manifest. Magcorp was deprived of the 
summary judgment ruling granted by the ALJ and wad denied the 
finality that order acquired after the statutory thirty days had 
elapsed. Magcorp requests this court to reverse the Commission and 
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to reinstate the Order and Findings And Conclusions entered by the 
ALJ on June 10, 1992. 
II. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
IT REVERSED THE ALJ'S ORDER AND ENTERED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MAGCORP. 
The effect of the Order Granting Motion For Review issued by 
the Commission was to reverse the ALJ's decision and to enter 
summary judgment against Magcorp. The Commission addressed the 
question of whether the flame resistant coveralls required by UOSH 
were "uniquely personal" to the wearer and determined that they 
were not. [R. 338-340]. It arrived at that conclusion without the 
benefit of the actual hands-on examination of the coveralls that 
the ALJ performed. [R. 441-445]. The Commission then determined 
that the cost of the coveralls should be properly born by Magcorp. 
[R. 339-340]. 
The inescapable truth is that the Commission determined that 
there were disputed issues of fact that prevented the ALJ from 
entering summary judgment in this case: 
In the present case, the ALJ held a hearing on 
Magcorp's motion for summary judgment, heard 
argument and examined the coveralls at issue. 
The ALJ then found that the coveralls were 
uniquely personal protective equipment and 
concluded as a matter of law that the cost of 
the coveralls could be placed on the employees 
under the reasoning in Budd. The ALJ then 
issued findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and an order granting Magcorp's motion for 
summary judgment. 
We don't believe that the order in this case 
should properly be classified as one of 
summary judgment because there were disputed 
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questions of fact argued before the judge, 
(emphasis added). 
Order Granting Motion For Review at 4. [R. 0339]. What the 
Commission failed to explain was what authority enabled it, after 
less deliberation than the ALJ engaged in, to summarily rule 
against Magcorp. 
If indeed disputed issues of material facts existed, it was 
clearly improper for the Commission to reverse the ALJ's Order and 
enter summary judgment against Magcorp when disputed issues of 
material facts were recognized by the Commission. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(emphasis added). 
The Commission also erred because it is clear from the 
Findings And Conclusions and the Order entered by the ALJ that the 
only issues of disputed fact that existed related only to the 
question of whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132(a), by not 
requiring the use of flame resistant protective clothing in the 
electrolytic and reactor sections of the facility. [R. 170-171, 
174]. The ALJ properly denied summary judgment on that issue as 
requested by UOSH. [R. 171, 174]. Based on that ruling, Magcorp, 
on April 28, 1992, withdrew its objection to the notice of penalty 
issued in conjunction with the citation and paid the $2,200.00 
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penalty that UOSH had assessed. [R. 314]. This payment of penalty 
was based solely on the fact that Magcorp did not require its 
employees to wear flame resistant personal protective clothing and 
was not an admission that Magcorp was required to provide the 
clothing at its expense. [R. 314]. As a practical matter, the cost 
of defending the allegation far exceeded the financial penalty. 
The ALJ's decision was legally sound and supported by The Budd Co. 
V. OSHRC. 513 F.2d 807 (3rd Cir. 1975), 2 OSCH 1698 (1975). 
The Order Granting Motion For Review is confusing and does not 
strictly comply with Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-12(6)(c) (1988). "An 
administrative agency must make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law that are adequately detailed so as to permit meaningful 
appellate review." Adams v. Board of Reviewr 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 
App. 1991); see also La Sal Oil v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 
843 P.2d 1047-48 (Utah App. 1992). 
It is also essential that the Commission make 
subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that 
the critical subordinate factual issues are 
highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as 
to demonstrate that there is a logical and 
legal basis for the ultimate conclusions. The 
importance of complete, accurate, and 
consistent findings of fact is essential to a 
proper determination by an administrative 
agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are 
reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dal ton, 598 
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such 
findings, this Court cannot perform its duty 
of reviewing the Commission's order in 
accordance with established legal principles 
and of protecting the parties and public from 
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arbitrary and capricious administrative 
action. 
Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 
(Utah 1986); see also Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Division of 
Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah App. 1990) (noting "the 
importance of adequate findings supporting agency decisions"). The 
proper remedy, assuming arguendo that this court has jurisdiction, 
is remand. But because the Commission has already concluded that 
genuine issues of material facts exist, this court should remand 
the case to the Commission with specific direction that they return 
the case to the ALJ for a full hearing addressing the merits of the 
Citation And Notification Of Penalty. No purpose would be served 
by a remand to the Commission to formulate more adequate findings 
in support of, and to more fully articulate the reasons for their 
decision. 
The most glaring error is the fact that the Commission went 
beyond UOSH,s prayer for relief that requested the ALJ's decision 
be reversed and the case remanded for a full hearing on the merits. 
[R. 182]. At most, the Commission had authority to remand the case 
back to the ALJ for a full hearing on the merits as UOSH requested. 
Utah Code Ann.. § 63-46b-12(6)(c)(vi) (1988). There is no legal 
authority to support the Commissions action in first finding 
disputed issues of material facts and then summarily reversing the 
ALJ's Order in entering judgment against Magcorp. 
The Commission's actions with respect to its reversal of the 
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ALJ's partial summary judgment order and entry of summary judgment 
against Magcorp manifestly arbitrary and capricious. The 
Commission acted beyond its authority, engaged in an unlawful 
decision making process, based its decision on facts either 
disputed or not supported by substantial evidence, and clearly 
abused its discretion. If this court accepts the Commission's 
conclusion that genuine issues of material facts exist, Magcorp 
requests that it be allowed a full hearing on the merits of the 
Citation And Notifiction Of Penalty before the ALJ. 
III. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
IT ORDERED MAGCORP TO PROVIDE AND PAY FOR 
LAUNDRY SERVICES FOR ITS EMPLOYEES FOR 
PROTECTIVE COVERALLS EXPOSED TO FIBERFRAX 
WITHOUT FIRST AFFORDING MAGCORP NOTICE AND A 
HEARING ON THE ISSUE. 
Magcorp was denied due process and proper notice when the 
Commission considered the issue of who should pay for laundry 
service for the coveralls and the related question of Fiberfrax 
contamination. [R. 338-340]. The Commission ordered "that the 
employers shall provide, at no cost to its employees, laundry 
service for the protective coveralls that have been exposed to 
Fiberfrax as specified in the Material Safety Data Sheet." Order 
Granting Motion For Review at 5 [R. 340]. These were issues that 
were not plead in the September 3, 1991 Citation And Notification 
Of Penalty that initiated this action. [R. 001-003]. 
In Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.. 680 P.2d 733, 
736 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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It is error to adjudicate issues not raised 
before or during trial and unsupported by the 
record. Curran v. Mount, Ala., 657 P.2d 389 
(1980). The trial court is not privileged to 
determine matters outside the issues of the 
case, and if he does, his findings will have 
no force and effect. Brantley v. Carlsbad 
Jrr. Dist., 92 N.M. 280, 587 P.2d 427 (1978). 
In law or in equity, a judgment must be 
responsive to tre issues framed by the 
pleadings, and a i/ial court has no authority 
to render a decision on issues not presented 
for determination. Any findings rendered 
outside the issues are a nullity. Matter of 
Estate of Hurlbutt, 36 Or.App. 721, 585 P.2d 
724 (1978); Credit Investment and Loan Co. v. 
Guarranty Bank and Trust Co., 166 Colo. 471, 
444 P.2d 633 (1980). A court may not grant 
judgment for relief which is neither requested 
by the pleadings nor within the theory on 
which the case was tried, whether that theory 
was expressly stated or implied by the proof 
adduced. Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside 
Terrace, 90 N.M. 34, 559 P.2d 411 (1977). 
Parties may limit the scope of the litigation 
if they choose, and if an issue is clearly 
withheld, the court cannot nevertheless 
adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief. 
Wineglass Ranches, Inc. v. Campbell, 12 Ariz. 
App. 571, 473 P.2d 496 (1970); La Bellman v. 
Gleason & Sanders, Inc., Okl., 418 P.2d 949 
(1980). 
The principals stated in Combe are equally applicable to a 
reviewing tribunal such as the Commission. 
The Commission clearly embraced issues that were not raised in 
the Citation And Notification Of Penalty. The laundry services 
portion of the Order Granting Motion For Review was apparently 
based on the Material Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS") submitted via 
affidavit to the ALJ prior to the hearing. [R. 116, 423-424]. 
However, no material evidence was presented that Fiberfrax in any 
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quantity was present in areas where it was exposed to temperatures 
in excess of 1800 degrees fahrenheit, the point at which the 
material could undergo partial conversion to crystobalite, 
requiring special caution in conjunction with their use. [R. 148-
49, 121]. The ALJ, if he considered that evidence at all, 
considered it only as it related to the coveralls being "uniquely 
personal." The Commission should not have decided the issue unless 
it had been properly raised and the ALJ had the first opportunity 
to address it. Smith v. Iverson, 848 P.2d 677, 677 (Utah 1982). 
The Commission's order that Magcorp pay for laundry service 
for the protective coveralls is completely without authority and 
reason. It admits to not even a modicum of propriety. 
Sua Sponte decisions ... are inconsistent with 
the notion of due process when parties are not 
provided advance notice that the court is 
considering a given course of action, and the 
losing party is not allowed to be heard 
thereon. "The right to prior notice and an 
opportunity to be heard is a critical part of 
our judical system. . . .A method of resolving 
cases that by passes this requirement can not 
be accepted as a fair, neutral, and rational 
process." Rubins, 813 P.2d at 780 (citing 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 
1011 (1970); see also Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 
P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) ("Timely and 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard 
in a meaningful way are at the very heart of 
procedural fairness"). (footnote omitted). 
Jenkins v. Weis. 230 U.A.R. 25, 31, P.2d (Utah App. 
1994). 
The Commission's laundry services payment decision was an 
eggregious example of arbitrary and capricious action and otherwise 
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ran afoul of Utah Code Ann,, § 63-46b-16(4). Magcorp requests this 
court to reverse the laundry services portion of the Order Granting 
Motion For Review. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider 
UOSH,s Motion For Review because the motion was filed more than 30 
days after the Order and Findings And Conclusions were signed by 
the ALJ and issued by the Commission on June 10, IS,.;* 
Accordingly, the Order Granting Motion For Review entered by the 
Industrial Commission on December 17, 1992, and the Interim Order 
Denying Motion To Dismiss are null and void. In addition, the 
Commissions Order Granting Extension Of Time entered after remand 
was similarly entered without jurisdiction and erroneous as a 
matter of law. Magcorp requests that those orders be declared void 
for lack of jurisdiction and that the ALJ's June 10, 1992 order be 
declared and remain the final judgment in this case. 
I 
In the alternative, should the court determine that the 
Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over this matter when it 
issued its Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss and Order 
Granting Motion For Review as well as the belated Order Granting 
Motion For Extension Of Time on remand, Magcorp requests that the 
case be remanded back to the P J to afford Magcorp a full hearing 
on the merits of the issues raised in the Citation And Notification 
Of Penalty and that the Commission's laundry services payment 
decision that denied Magcorp notice and due process be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this c^O day of February, 1994. 
CONDER, WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS 
srrald D. Conder 
feter L. Rognlie 
'Attorneys for Magcorp 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Peter L. Rognlie, certify that on the <^^T~day of 
February, 1994, I served 2 copies of the attached Brief of 
Appellee, upon Thomas C. Sturdy, counsel for the Occupational 
Safety and Health Division and Sharon J. Eblen, counsel for the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, by mailing the copies to them by 
first-class mail, with sufficient postage prepaid, to the following 
address: 
Thomas C. Sturdy, Esq. 
Occupational Safety and Health Division 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor 
P. O. Box 146650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6650 
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, Third Floor 
P. 0. Box 146600 





TABLE OF CONTENTS: Document 
Opinions, findings of fact# conclusions of law 
delivered by the ALJ and the Industrial Commission: 
Citation and Notification of Penalty (9/3/91) A 
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law (6/10/92) B 
Order (6/10/92) C 
Interim Order Denying Motion To Dismiss (10/9/92) D 
Order Granting Motion For Review (12/17/92) E 
Order Granting Motion For Extension Of Time F 
Determinative authorities: 
Utah Code Ann, , § 35-9-12 (1989) G 
Utah Code Ann, . § 63-46b-12 (1988) H 
Utah Code Ann, . § 63-46b-16 (1988) I 
Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure J 
Rule 81(d) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure K 
43 
Tab A 
CITATION AND NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY 
Douglas J. McVey, Administrator 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Division 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 519870 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0870 








: 7 / 3 0 / 9 1 - 8 / 9 / 9 1 
Inspection Site 
:Rowley, 84029 
To: Magnesium Corp. of America 
238 North 2200 West 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84116 
CITATION AND NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY: The violation(s) described in this Citation are alleged to have occurred 
on or about the day the inspection was made unless otherwise indicated in the description given below. This 
citation (or copy) must be posted at or near the location of alleged violation. The citation must be posted 
until the violation is corrected or abated or for 3 working days, whichever is longer. Assessed penalties are 
payable to the Industrial Commission unless a notice of contest is mailed to the Administrator as indicated 
below. 
CONTESTS AND APPEALS: Employers may request an informal review by the U0SH Administrator of any citation, 
proposed penalty or abatement period. Employees may request an informal review of the abatement period granted 
to the employer. Informal reviews do not stay the 30 days in which an employer must file a contest for a formal 
hearing before the Industrial Commission. 
The Industrial Commission will provide an adjudicative hearing if an employer files a written notice of contest 
with the Administrator within 30 days of receipt of the Citation or Proposed Penalties. Upon expiration of the 
30 day period the Citation and Proposed Penalties are final and not subject to review by any court or agency. 
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS: Any employee or representative of employees who believes that the periods of time fixed for 
correction or abatement of a violation is unreasonable has the right to contest the periods of time by 
submitting a letter to the Administrator within 30 days of issuance of the citation. 
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee filed a 
complaint with the division, instituted any proceeding with the division, conversed with a division 
representative, or testified in any proceeding or exercised any right afforded under the act, standards or rules 
of the division. Any employee who suffers adverse working conditions based on the above must contact the 
Administrator within 30 days. 
CITED ITEMS BEGIN ON FOLLOWING PAGE, AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE AND TOTAL PENALTIES APPEAR ON FINAL PAGE. 
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Description Oate Violation 
Must Be Abated 
Penalty 
The following are violations of the Utah Administrative Code and the 
provisions of 29 CFR 1910 or 1926 which are incorporated by reference, 
Utah specific standards begin with Utah General Safety Orders (UGSO) 
The citation issued 8/27/91 is withdrawn 




Protective equipment, including personal protective equipment for eyes, 
face, head, and extremities, protective clothing, respiratory devices, 
and protective shields and barriers, shall be provided, used, and 
maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever it is 
necessary by reason of hazards of processes or environment, chemical 
hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical irritants encountered in a 
manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the function of any 
part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact. 
MOTE: NFPA 480-2-1.6 requires operators in melting and casting areas 
shall wear flame-resistant clothing, high foundry shoes, and adequate 
face protection. 
(A) Employees at Magnesium Corp., such as but not 
limited to the Pot Hauler (CB), RAFO (Reactor 
Auxiliary Feed Operator), Reactor Helper, 
Smutters, Cell Service, Brickies, working with 
and in the vacinity of molten material, were 
not wearing flame resistive clothing. 
(B) Employees at Magnesium Corp., were working with 
and around molten material and not wearing flame 
resistive clothing. Most of these employees had 
burn holes in their coveralls from the material 
splashing, and some of them had on coveralls 
that were brittle from the radiant heat. The 
coveralls they were wearing were made of 65% 
cotton and 35% polyester. 
ABATEMENT MOTE: Flame resistive clothing shall be provided and 
maintained by the employer at no cost or financial expense to the 
employee. The Penalty of $2,700 will be waivered provided the penalty 
is used towards the purchase of protective clothing, and documentation 
is provided to UOSH. 





Description Oate Violation 





Solid decking shall be provided where a hazard exists of free flowing 
hot material falling from one floor to another. 
(A) Floor decking at Mag. Corp. such as, but not 
limited to the reactor building around the 
launder, where molten material could fall 
from floor to floor was not solid decking 
to eliminate the hazard of free flowing hot 
material 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Administrative Judge: 
1 Donald L. George 
Magnesium Corporation of America's (Magcorp) Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on the 17th day of 
April, 199 2, the Honorable Donald L. George presiding. Magcorp 
was represented by counsel, Jerrald D. Conder and Michelle J. 
Ivie. Thomas C. Sturdy appeared on behalf of the Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Commission. Having reviewed the 
pleadings on file regarding the above-referenced motion and the 
Court having heard argument from each of the parties thereon, and 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes its Finding of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
00t£3 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on August 27, 1991 Magcorp receivd a citation and 
notice of penalty for failure to require the use of flame 
resistant protective clothing in the electrolytic and reactor 
sections of the facility in violation of 29 CFR 1910.132. 
2. That the citation and notice of penalty contained the 
following note: 
NOTE: NFPA 480-2-1.6 requires operators in melting 
and casting areas shall wear flame resistant 
clothing, non-foundry shoes and adequate 
face protection. 
3. That UOSHA agreed that NFPA 480-2-1.6 has not been 
codified into the Utah Administrative Code or other UOSHA 
regulations pertaining to personal protective equipment. 
4. A material issue of disputed fact exists with regard to 
whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 by not requiring the use 
of flame resistant protective clothing in the electrolytic and 
reactor sections of the facility. 
5. That the citation received by Magcorp contained an 
abatement order requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame 
resistant protective equipment required under the citation and 
notice of penalty. 
6. That the personal protective equipment at issue herein, 
to wit, coveralls, are uniquely personal to each individual 
employee at Magcorp since the coveralls are individually fitted 
-2-
to the employee, many bear the name of the individual employee, 
and the coveralls are the type of garment that may be used by 
employees away from the Magcorp facility. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this court has jurisdiction over the parties in the 
above-entitled matter. 
2. That disputed material issues of fact exist with regard 
to whether Magcorp is in compliance with the requirements of 29 
CFR 1910.132(a) and Summary Judgment on that issue is therefore 
denied. 
3. That based upon the holding in Budd Co. v. OSHRC and 
Federal OSHA Mandate, UOSHA has no legal or other authority to 
impose the cost of uniquely personal protective equipment, such 
as the coveralls at issue herein, upon Magcorp. 
4. That the Abatement Order contained in the UOSHA citation 
to Magcorp requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame resistant 
coveralls purportedly required under 29 CFR 1910.132(a) is 
unenforceable and void as a matter of law. 
5. Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Magcorp on the 
issue of cost allocation under 29 CFR 1910.132(a). 
DATED this /Qjffiflay of JUj^t , 1992. 
Approved as t o Form: 
IAAAAQ ( (QM$\ 
Thomas C. Sturdy \ ) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of Mayf 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
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Thomas C. Sturdy 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Division of Legal Affairs 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
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MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF 
AMERICA, 
Respondent. 
O R D E R 
Administrative Judge: 
Donald L. George 
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
entered herein, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Magcorpfs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on 
the issue of cost allocation for personal protective equipment 
required under 29 CFR 1910.132, and the abatement note contained 
in the citation and notice of penalty issued in connection with 
inspection no. 105638639, which required Magcorp to provide flame 
resistant coveralls to Magcorp employees at no cost or financial 
expense to the employees is void and unenforceable as a matter of 
law. 
oot1?** 
2. That disputed issues of material fact exist with regard 
to whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 and summary judgment 
on this issue is denied. 
DATED this ffljjday of vj jJU^Z 
JT 
, 1992 
Passed by the Industrial Conalssioa 
of Utchj Salt Lake City, Utah, thi« 
/aZOzzy of (^,~-~< > » 19 9%~ 
W * r : ^)r0 ,4^/> 
Commission Secretary i £. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Thomas C. S t u r d y 
BY THE COURT 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complainant's Motion for Review 
of the administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dated June 10, 1992. 
The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 3 5-9-12, 
and Section 63-46b-12. 
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June 10, 
1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium Corporation of 
America (respondent or Magcorp) on the issue of whether the 
Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah (UOSH) could place the cost of providing flame 
resistant coveralls for its employees on the respondent. The 
citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH required the 
respondent to provide flame resistent coveralls to its employees at 
no cost. The ALJ issued an order of summary judgment finding that 
the citation was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. The 
ALJ further found that there were disputed issues of material fact 
on the issue of whether the respondent violated 29 CFR 1910.132 for 
its failure to require the use of flame resistent protective 
clothing in the electrolytic and reactor sections of its facility. 
Although the order of the ALJ was signed on June 10, 1992, the 
mailing certificate shows that the order was mailed on June 16, 
1992. The UOSH filed a motion for review on July 16, 1992 pursuant 
to 63-4 6b-12 seeking review of the order of summary judgment. The 
respondent filed a motion to dismiss UOSH's motion for review for 
untimeliness. 
The respondent asserts that the ALJ's order was "issued" on June 
10, 1992 because the order was executed in front of the party's 
attorneys and because Mr. Conder, attorney for Magcorp was 
personally served a copy of the order on that date. Mr. Conder 
then offered a copy of the order to Mr. Sturdy, counsel for UOSH. 
Mr. Sturdy declined Mr. Conder's offer of a copy of the order. No 
certificate of service was executed on June 10, 1992 when the order 
was delivered to Mr. Conder. 
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order and requested a copy from the adjudication division. He 
received his copy of the order and a mailing certificate was 
executed on June 16, 1992. Subsequently, UOSH filed its motion for 
review on July 16, 1992. The respondent asserts that the motion 
for review was untimely filed and asks that it be dismissed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the question of when an 
order constituting final agency action is issued. Wiggins v. Board 
of Review, 178 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992) . In Wiggins, 
the court held that "'issue' as used in section 63-46b-14 (3) (a) 
means the date the agency action is properly mailed as accurately 
evidenced by the certificate of mailing, or personally served." 
This definition of "issue" can legitimately be applied to 63-46b-
12, the section of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act which 
governs agency review of adjudicative proceedings. 
This case involves an agency order which was signed and personally 
delivered to the respondent on June 10, 1992 without preparation of 
a mailing certificate. The complainant received the order with a 
mailing certificate which shows an issuance date of June 16, 1992. 
The date of issuance of an agency decision must be certain, 
otherwise the jurisdiction of the agency or court to review an 
agency order will be uncertain. 
In this case, the confusion over the date of issuance stems from 
the adjudication division's failure to properly prepare a 
certificate of mailing and place its order in the mail on the date 
the order was hand delivered to the respondent. However, to rule 
that the order was issued on June 10, 1992 when the certificate of 
mailing shows that the order was mailed on June 16, 1992 will 
unfairly prejudice the complainant who relied on the date on the 
mailing certificate in submitting its motion for review. The 
normal practice of the commission is to issue its orders by mail, 
therefore, we believe that the order was not properly "issued" on 
June 10, 1992 even though it was hand delivered to the respondent 
on that date. An order of the commission will not be considered 
to have been "issued" until the date it is mailed or hand delivered 
to the parties accompanied by a properly executed mailing 
certificate or certificate of service. The date on the mailing 
certificate or certificate of service will be considered to be the 
date the order was "issued" by the commission. We believe that 
this approach is consistent with the recent opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 178 Utah Adv. Rep. 
29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). 
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IT IS ORDERED that the motion for review of the complainant in 
this matter was timely filed based upon the date of issuance of the 
order as reflected on the mailing certificate. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall be given 15 
days from the date of mailing of this order to file a response to 
the complainant's motion for review, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 63-46b-12. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the 
Complainant's Motion for Review of the administrative law judge's 
(ALJ) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated June 10, 
1992. The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 35-
9-12, and Section 63-46b-12. 
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June 
10, 1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium 
Corporation of America ("respondent11 or "Magcorp11) on the is^ue of 
whether the Occupational Health and Safety Division of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah ("UOSH") could place the cost of 
providing flame resistant coveralls for its employees on \the 
respondent. The citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH 
required the respondeat to provide flame resistent coveralls to its 
employees at no cost. The ALJ issued an order granting the 
respondent/s motion for summary judgment finding that the citation 
was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. On April 28, 1992, 
Magcorp withdrew its objection to the citation and tendered payment 
of the penalty due under the citation. Respondent's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities, Exhibit C. 
The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act ("UOSHA") provides 
that the commission is "empowered to administer all laws and lawful 
orders to ensure that every employee in this state has a workplace 
free of recognized hazards." U.C.A. sec. 35-9-4 (1988). The 
commission has the "authority to assess all civil penalties 
provided in this section, giving due consideration to the 
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the 
business of the employer charged, the gravity of the violation, the 
good faith of the employer, and the history of any previous 
violations by the employer." 
I. WAS THE COST OF THE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
REQUIRED BY UOSH PROPERLY ALLOCATED TO THE 
RESPONDENT'S EMPLOYEES? 
The ALJ relied on Budd Co. v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 201 (1975) in 
ruling that the UOSH has no "legal or other authority to impose the 
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upon Magcorp." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3, June 
10, 1992. Budd held that 29 CFR 1910.132(a) did not mandate that 
employers bear the cost of protective footwear required by the 
regulation. 
29 CFR 1910.132(a) provides that: 
Protective equipment, including personal protective 
equipment [flPPEM ] for eyes, face, head, and extremities, 
protective clothing, respiratory devices, and protective 
shields and barriers, shall be provided, used and 
maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever 
it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes or 
environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or 
mechanical irritants encountered in a manner capable of 
causing injury or impairment in the function of any part 
of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical 
contact (emphasis added). 
29 CFR sec. 1910.132. 
Subpart (b) provides that "where employees provide their own 
protective equipment, the employer shall be responsible to assure 
its adequacy, including proper maintenance, and sanitation of such 
equipment." Id. In a footnote, the OSH Commission noted: 
We do not imply that an employer is not obliged to bear 
the cost of things such as capital equipment which it is 
ordinarily his responsibility to assume. We are here 
considering the cost allocation of personal equipment. 
. . . Thus, the most universally used type of protection 
[steel toed shoes] is uniquely personal and may be used 
by the employee when he is away from the job (emphasis 
added). 
Id. n. 5. 
A U.S. Department of Labor memorandum dated August 9, 1985, 
discussed the issue of cost allocation for PPE. The memorandum 
stated that it will be the position of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration that 29 CFR 1910.132 will be interpreted as 
follows: 
PPE that is uniquely personal, and which the employees 
may well use away from the job, is the type that an 
employer may require employees to pay for. Exactly who 
pays for this kind of PPE is a question to be resolved 
between the employer and his employees—it is an 
appropriate subject for collective bargaining. . . . as 
a broad guideline, we can conclude that an employee may 
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be required to pay for PPE that he alone will use, is of 
a personal nature, and may be used away from the job. 
OSHA Memorandum, August 9, 1985. 
Thus, the question at issue is whether the flame resistant 
coveralls required by UOSH are the type of PPE which is uniquely 
personal to the wearer. 
The UOSH asserts that the coveralls at issue are not uniquely 
personal to the wearer as are the steel toed shoes in Budd. The 
coveralls are sized like men's suits, i.e. 40, 42, etc., and many 
bear the employee's name. The UOSH asserts that the coveralls are 
contaminated with Fiberfrax, a carcinogenic ceramic fiber and 
should not be worn home prior to being laundered. The Material 
Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS") for Fiberfrax specifies in relevant part 
that: 
. . . ceramic fiber should be handled with caution. The 
handling practices described in this MSDS must be 
strictly followed . . . It is recommended that full body 
clothing should be worn to reduce the possibility of skin 
irritation. Washable or disposable clothing may be used. 
Do not take unwashed work clothing home. Work clothes 
should be washed separately from other clothing. Rinse 
washing machine thoroughly after use. If clothing is to 
be laundered by someone else, inform launderer of proper 
procedure clothes and street clothes should be kept 
separate to prevent contamination (emphasis added). 
MSDS at 6. 
The UOSH argues that the coveralls in question are not safe to 
be taken home or stored with other clothes without having first 
been laundered and therefore are not appropriate to be worn away 
from work. We agree that the MSDS requirements for laundering and 
sequestering contaminated clothing, make the coveralls more unique 
to the workplace than the individual employee. Magcorp has made 
coin operated laundry facilities available to its employees in 
order to address this concern. We believe that this response is 
inadequate to properly provide for the safety of Magcorp employees. 
The sizing of the coveralls in this case can be distinguished 
from the sizing of the shoes in Budd. Shoes, by their nature 
adjust and conform to the foot of the wearer becoming "uniquely 
personal" to the wearer. Coveralls, do not generally become 
"broken in" like a pair of shoes. The fit of a pair of coveralls 
is much less personal and unique than a pair of steel toed shoes. 
The coveralls may not be worn away from the workplace in the same 
manner as steel toed shoes because they are contaminated with 
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carcinogenic ceramic fibers. Due to the contamination, the 
coveralls must be laundered separately from other clothing and must 
be laundered before taking them home. We believe that PPE which an 
employee cannot readily wear home cannot realistically be 
considered "uniquely personal11 to the employee. 
The fact that the coveralls have the employee's name 
embroidered on them does not, in and of itself, make the coveralls 
uniquely personal to the wearer. Names on uniforms and work 
clothes can easily and inexpensively be changed to identify a new 
wearer. We do not believe that the sizing of the coveralls makes 
them unique to the wearer. Coveralls sized like men's suits could 
easily be shared among several employees as long as they are of the 
approximate same size. We therefore find that the flame resistant 
coveralls required by UOSH in Magcorp's "hot end" are not uniquely 
personal and that the cost of the coveralls should properly be 
borne by the employer. 
II. WAS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER IN THIS CASE? 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. 
In the present case, the ALJ held a hearing on Magcorp's 
motion for summary judgment, heard argument and examined the 
coveralls at issue. The ALJ then found that the coveralls were 
uniquely personal protective equipment and concluded as a matter of 
law that the cost of the coveralls could be placed on the employees 
under the reasoning in Budd. The ALJ then issued findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and an order granting Magcorp's. motion for 
summary judgment. 
We don't believe that the order in this case should properly 
be classified as one of summary judgment because there were 







IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion for review of the 
complainant in this matter is hereby granted. For the reasons 
stated above, we find that the cost of the flame resistant 
coveralls required by UOSH should properly be allocated to the 
employer. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall provide, at no 
cost to its employees, laundry service for the protective coveralls 
that have been exposed to Fiberfrax as specified in the Material 
Safety Data Sheet. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs for preparing a transcript for appeals purposes. 
(Colleen S« Col ton 
Commissioner J 
I abstain because of prior discussion with 
possibly related to the issues in this j^ ase. 
corp officials 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this J7tP day oi/d^s^L^J 1992 
ATTEST: 
^^iA^-^^j (D yr^yl. 
Patricia 0. Asliby 
Commission Secretary 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews the 
Complainant's Motion for Extension of Time pursuant to the limited 
order of remand issued by the Court of Appeals on April 29, 1993. 
On June 10, 1992 Judge Donald L. Georgev ("ALJ") issued an 
order dismissing a citation issued by the Utah Occupational Safety 
and Health Division ("UOSH") in connection with UOSH inspection 
number 105638639. The citation assessed a fine for the 
Respondent's failure to provide flame retardant coveralls pursuant 
to 29 CFR 1910.132. At the time of the citation, the respondent 
required its employees to pay for flame retardant coveralls to be 
used in the workplace. The ALJ found that the citation was void 
and unenforceable as•a matter of law. On Motion for Review, the 
Commission reversed the ALJ and ruled that the employer should 
provide the flame retardant coveralls. 
The Commission's Order was appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Court remanded the matter to the Commission for a 
determination whether UOSH showed good cause for an extension of 
time to file its motion for review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-
1(9). Our prior orders have not addressed the issue of good cause 
for an extension of time because no extension was originally 
requested. Under the law in existence at the time UOSH filed its 
motion for review, the motion was timely filed. 
DISCUSSION 
1. GOOD CAUSE 
UOSH asserts that it relied in good faith on Wiggins v. Board 
of Review1 when it filed its motion for review. UOSH further 
asserts that both Dusty 's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n2 and Bonded 
1
 824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992). 
2
 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992). 
ORDER GRANTING 
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Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. Sec.,3 were decided after UOSH 
filed its motion for review on July 16, 1992. 
The UOSH motion for review was filed thirty days from the date 
the ALJ's Order was mailed relying upon the January 23, 1992 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Wiggins. Wiggins held that the 
date an agency order is issued is the date the order is mailed as 
evidenced by the mailing certificate. On October 30, 1992, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that an agency order is issued on the date 
the order bears on its face, and not the date of mailing. Dusty/s 
at 9. On December 4, 1992, the Court of Appeals in Bicycle 
Couriers, held that Dusty's overruled Wiggins. 
Magcorp asserts that UOSH has not shown good cause to justify 
an extension of time under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(flUAPAff) . Magcorp further asserts that the time for filing a 
motion for review is jurisdictional under Varian Eimac v. 
Lamoreaux4 and that there is no specific statutory provision which 
allows the Commission to extend the time for filing a motion for 
review. 
We believe that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) clearly authorizes the 
Commission to grant an extension of time for filing a motion for 
review for good cause shown. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial 
Commission..5 UAPA provides that an "aggrieved party may file a 
written request for review within 3 0 days after the issuance of an 
order..."6 and that an agency may extend the time limits provided 
for good cause shown.7 Maverik filed a motion for Commission 
review of an administrative order one day late. The Court of 
Appeals recognized that, "absent a showing of good cause for an 
extension, the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12 requires, 
as a prerequisite to the agency taking jurisdiction over a review, 
actual delivery of the necessary documents to the agency within the 
thirty day time period." Maverick at 37. (emphasis added). 
We conclude that the UOSH motion for review was timely filed 
under the law in effect at the time of filing and that no extension 
3
 201 Ut. Adv. Rep. (Ct. App. 1992). 
4
 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989), 
5
 214 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1993). 
6
 U.C.A. § 63-46b-12(l)(a). 
7
 The agency may extend "any time period prescribed in this 
chapter, except those time periods prescribed for judicial review." 





of time was necessary. However, we also hold that if an extension 
of time is required then the subsequent change in the law 
constitutes good cause for an extension of time. 
2. APPLICABILITY OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Magcorp asserts that Rule 6 U.R.C.P. applies to the equation 
pursuant to Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P., and requires that UOSH show 
excusable neglect before an extension of time may be granted by the 
Commission. A showing of excusable neglect is not required. UOSH 
relied on the law in effect at the time of filing, so it is not 
necessary to show excusable neglect. 
We believe that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply 
to agency actions under UAPA unless UAPA provides otherwise. In 
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 6(e) and Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P. 
could be applied to administrative procedures "except insofar as 
such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable." The Griffith 
Court held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applied to extend the time for 
filing a petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail. 
Although footnote 1 in Lamoreaux opines that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. 
applies to extend the time for filing a motion for review, this 
position was discarded by the Court of Appeals in Maverik.8 
In 1983, the Utah Supreme Court noted that ,f[w]hile the mode 
of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil procedure in 
the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative 
proceedings. See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) .... Thus, administrative 
proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
unless the governing statute or regulations so provide." Pilcher 
v. Dep't of Social Services, 663 P. 2d 450 (Utah 1983) (emphasis 
added). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly 
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative 
proceedings in Utah. 
The UAPA provides in relevant part, "except as otherwise 
provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by 
specific reference to this chapter, the provisions of this chapter 
apply to every agency of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. § 63-46b-
1(1) (1989) (emphasis added). The UAPA does not generally state 
that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all administrative 
proceedings. To the contrary, the UAPA contains only limited, 





specific references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure9. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The ALJ's Order was issued on June 10, 1992 and mailed to 
the parties on June 16, 1992. 
2. The Utah Division of Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH) 
Motion for Review was filed with the Commission on July 16, 1992. 
3. Under the January 23, 1992 order in Wiggins v. Board of 
Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992), an agency order was 
considered issued on the date it was mailed. 
4. The Commission relied on the Wiggins decision in its 
Interim Order of October 9, 1992 which held that the UOSH motion 
for review was timely filed. 
5. The law regarding the issuance of agency orders was changed 
by the October 30, 1992 Order of the Utah Supreme Court in Dusty's 
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992). 
Under Dusty's, an order is considered issued on the date the order 
bears on its face. 
6. The UOSH relied in good faith on the Wiggins decision in 
filing its motion for review on July 16, 1992. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Wiggins was the law in effect at the time UOSH filed its 
motion for review. We believe that UOSH's reliance on the law at 
the time of filing is good cause to support the grant of an 
extension of time for filing. 
9
 See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) (providing that Rules 12(b) and 
56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to dismiss or for summary judgment 
except to the extent that those rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A. 
§ 63-46b-7 (providing that the rules of discovery under the 
U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not enacted rules for discovery); 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that a defaulted party may file a 
motion to set aside a default order under the procedures outlined 
in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(2) (providing that a petition 
for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be 
a complaint governed by the U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings 
and proceedings in the district court are governed by the 
U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-19(l)(c) (providing that the venue for 
proceedings to enforce agency orders is governed by the 





We conclude that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply to agency actions under UAPA unless expressly adopted under 
UAPA, Therefore, UOSH must merely show good cause for an extension 
under UAPA and does not need to meet the requirements of Rule 6 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the complainant in this matter is 
hereby granted an extension of time in which to file a motion for 
review of the June 10, 1992 order of the administrative law judge. 
day of (DcJTJ^ DATED this ^0 1993. 
\s~* 






Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
I abstain because of prior discussion with Magcorp officials 
possibly related to the issues in this case, 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
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35-9-12. Procedure for review of order entered by admin-
istrative law judge — Continuing jurisdiction of 
commission. 
(1) The functions and duties of the commission shall be those quasi-judicial 
functions listed in this chapter. 
(2) Every official act of the commission shall be entered of record and irs 
hearings and; records shall be open to the public. 
(3) (a) Administrative law judges appointed by the commission shall hear 
and determine any proceeding assigned to them by the commission. 
(b) The administrative law judge shall enter his findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and order not later than 30 days after final receipt of all 
matters concerned in the hearing. 
(c) Thejfindings of fact, conclusions of law, and order of the administra-
tive law judge shall become the final order of the commission unless 
objections! are made in accordance with Subsection (4). 
(4) (a) Any;party of interest who is dissatisfied with the order entered by 
an administrative law judge may obtain a review by the commission, by 
filing a motion for review with the commission in accordance with Section 
63-46b-12. 
(b) The commission may affirm, modify, remand, or overrule the order 
of the administrative law judge. 
(c> The decision of the commission is final unless judicial review is 
requested in accordance with Section 63-46b-14. 
(d) To the extent that new facts are provided, the commission has con-
tinuing jurisdiction to amend, reverse, or enhance prior orders. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 69, § 12; 1981, ch. 1, 
§ 4; 1985, ch. 161, § 6; 1987, ch. 161, § 116; 
1989, ch. 265, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 19S9 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989. deleted former 
Subsections <1> to (3» relating- to the creation, 
offices and meetings, and personnel of the 
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission and redesignated former Subsec-
tions (4) to ' 7 ' as Subsections 1 > to !4>; deleted 
"review'' before ''commission" throughout the 
section; deleted former Subsection <5"b) which 
read "The review commission may adopt rules 
for the orderly conduct of business that are 
consistent with the Industrial Commission's 
Rules"; substituted "the commission"' for ''a re-
view commissioner" at the end of Subsection 
(3Ha); substituted "enter" for "transmit" End 
"order" for "a recommended order to the review 
commission" in Subsection c'3 »• b»: deleted "rec-
ommended" before "order" and substituted "ad-
ministrative law judge" for "hearing exam-
iner" and "Subsection i4 f for "Subsection 
in Subsection '3><c : substituted "commis.-. .:• 
in accordance with Section 63-46b-12" for "---:-
retary of the review commission" at the enc of 
Subsection (4)(a>; rewrote Subsection »4 b-
which read ' 'The review commission may adopt 
the recommended order, modify the order, or 
refer the matter to the hearing examiner for 
further proceedings"; added "in accordar.ee 
with Section 63-46b-14" to Subsection <4• <:•: 
and added Subsection (4Hd>. 
TabH 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the. agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative 
proceeding to seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior 
agency, the aggrieved party may file a written request for review within 
30 days after the issuance of the order with the person or entity desig-
nated for that purpose by the statute or rule, 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to each party. 
,~, TTitiim JLU uays 01 me mailing date of the request for review, or within 
the time period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may 
file a response with the person designated by statute or rule to receive the 
response. One copy of the response shall be seni by mail to each of the parties 
and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the 
agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the 
order within a reasonable time or within the time required by statute or the 
agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule 
permit the parties to file briefs or other papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other 
filings, or oral argument, or within the time required by statute or appli-
cable rules, the agency or superior agency shall issue a written order on 
review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a 
person designated by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to 
each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring re-
view; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each pf the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be 
affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether all or any portion of the 
adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration 
or judicial review available to aggrieved parties: and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-12, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 268; 1988, ch. 72, § 22. 
Tab I 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. and standard, §5 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
Tab J 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued exis-
tence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to 
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as other-
wise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some 
other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
TabK 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings 
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement 
of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply 
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administra-
tive board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure 
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or incon-
sistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall 
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
